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Abstract
This chapter summarizes the latest (post-2012) eminent domain law in Taiwan. It
focuses on the six pillars of takings law, namely public interest criteria, subjects of the
eminent domain power, just compensation, due process, distribution of development
surpluses, and the dispute resolution system. The 2012 reform brings along takings
laws in books that are stricter than ever in terms of public interest and necessity
analysis, but administrative courts typically defer to the administrative agencies’
judgments. Only government agencies and certain public legal persons can apply to
the state to condemn. Just compensation now means payment of current market value,
but the differences between how much condemnees receive pre- and post- 2012
remain unclear. Procedural requirements regarding expropriation constitute an
intricate web of rules. Nonetheless, in the process of negotiated purchase, local
governments are often criticized for not bargaining in good faith. Thus, the due
process requirement does not guarantee substantive equity or efficiency. Development
surpluses go entirely to the state. The dispute resolution system consists of two or
three levels of re-examination within the administrative branch before the
condemnees can bring their cases to the administrative court. This chapter concludes
with a policy recommendation that uses hedonic regression models to estimate land
value for offers in the negotiated purchase stage and for the land value in the takings
compensation stage.
Keywords
Takings compensation, due process, hedonic regression model, public interest, just
compensation, dispute resolution, development surplus, appraisal, judicial review
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Constitution of Taiwan fails to include a “just compensation” clause or a
“public use” clause. Article 143, Section 1 of the Constitution of Taiwan does
prescribe that “[a]ll land within the territory of the Republic of China shall belong to
the whole body of citizens. Private ownership of land, acquired by the people in
accordance with law, shall be protected and restricted by law. Privately-owned land
shall be liable to taxation according to its value, and the Government may buy such
land according to its value.” As the final clause (buy…land) is interpreted as different
from expropriation, the constitution provides little guidance in determining the scope
and limit of eminent domain. However, the Constitutional Court is not entirely absent
from this scene. In fact, in a number of constitutional interpretations, 1 the
Constitutional Court constructed the constitutional mandate regarding the
governmental use of the eminent domain power. Not all of the interpretations are
equally influential. It should be fair to say that those on due process have shaped the
evolution of takings law by prompting the revision of the relevant statutes formerly
declared unconstitutional. By contrast, the interpretations regarding just compensation
and public interest are more expressive than substantive, as the Constitutional Court
has yet to advance concrete tests that the government or the administrative courts can
1

Interpretation Nos. 110, 215, 236, 336, 400, 409, 425, 440, 508, 513, 516, 534, 579, and 652.
1
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apply in future cases.

As a result, eminent domain law in Taiwan is mainly statutory and regulatory.
The legislature and the administration have a wide discretion in shaping the takings
law. In introducing the “Six Pillars” of the taking laws in Taiwan, this chapter draws
heavily on statutes and administrative regulations, while also keeping an eye on
decisions made by the administrative courts. Since the year 2000, the Land
Expropriation Act (hereinafter “LEA”) has been the major source of law for takings of
land and fixtures. Before then, expropriation stipulations were scattered in many
different statutes. Now, pursuant to Article 1, Paragraphs 1–2 of the LEA, “Land
expropriation shall be governed by this Act. Matters not provided in this Act shall be
governed by other applicable laws. Where other laws are inconsistent with this Act
with regard to expropriation procedures and expropriation compensation standards,
this Act shall prevail.” 2 Hence, this chapter frequently turns to the LEA and the
regulations stipulated to complement the LEA.

In the LEA, 3 there are three types of expropriation: land expropriation, zone

2

In this chapter, I will rely on the official translations of the Constitution, statutes, and regulations,

available at the official website of the Ministry of Justice, Taiwan, http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/.
3

The Land Act also considers a “moratorium to develop” as one type of takings. Land subject to the

moratorium will usually be condemned at a later date.
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expropriation, and incidental expropriation. This chapter focuses on land
expropriation, which is used in a broad swath of undertakings to condemn one or
multiple land parcels. Zone expropriation is the condemnation of all land parcels in
one specific area. The fundamentals of zone expropriations and land expropriation are
the same, but zone expropriation can only be used in more limited circumstances
(such as urban revitalization) and is subject to stricter procedural requirements. Due to
limited space, zone expropriation will be covered only in Part VI, where the unique
compensation options are summarized. Incidental expropriation refers to the
condemnation of fixtures on the land. Its procedure is combined with that of land
expropriation and zone expropriation. As such, incidental expropriation will be
covered in the discussions of the six pillars below. Official statistics regarding the
practice of land expropriation and zone expropriation in Taiwan from 2001 to 2013
are shown in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively.

This chapter is divided into seven parts, the first six of which introduce the six
pillars of eminent domain: public interest criteria, subjects of the eminent domain
power, just compensation, due process, distribution of development surpluses, and the
dispute resolution system. Before concluding, Part VII provides the author’s own
reform proposal of eminent domain law in Taiwan.

3
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II. PUBLIC INTEREST CRITERIA

Public interest and necessity are the two key criteria to meet before the state
exercises its eminent domain power. Article 15 of the Taiwan Constitution protects
private property rights, and Article 23 and a long list of constitutional interpretations
have established that private property rights and other human rights can be limited, if
commensurate with the “proportionality principle.” 4 Article 3 of the LEA further
spells out that takings must be “for public interest purposes” and “to the extent strictly
required.” These two criteria are abstract. Unfortunately, neither the Constitutional
Court nor the Supreme Administrative Court has developed clearer tests to implement
these two statutory requirements. Administrative courts, in particular, have been
extremely deferential to the government in these two matters, essentially giving the
latter a blank check (Chang 2010).

Takings of real properties are further limited to certain undertakings. Article 3 of
the LEA first lists nine concrete undertakings: National defense; communication or
transportation; public utility enterprises; water conservancy; public health and
environmental protection; government office buildings, office buildings of local selfgoverning bodies and other public buildings; educational, academic and cultural

4

For application of the proportionality principle in Taiwan and other East Asian countries, see Huang
and Law (2015)
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undertakings; social welfare; and state-owned enterprises. Then Article 3 of the LEA
is willing to accommodate “other undertakings for which land may be expropriated
according to law.” The devil is in the details. The Ministry of the Interior, the central
competent agency in charge of the LEA, has identified 29 other statutes that authorize
expropriation of real estates. In short, the state can also condemn properties for the
following undertakings: building subways, railroads, highways, city roads, science
parks, export zones, national parks, public housing, public cemetery, airports, fishery
ports and international business ports, wild animal protection zones, water aqueducts,
and high schools and elementary schools; preserving landmarks; consolidating oddlyshaped land; urban renewal; flood prevention; establishing produce markets; among
others (the Ministry of the Interior 2013a: 7–10). Due to the open-ended nature of the
list, the legislature can at any time expand the scope of takings without amending the
high-profile LEA.

The hands-off attitude of the court led to several controversial, large-scale
takings around 2011. Mass protests, scholarly critiques, and the presidential election
in March 2012 led to a major revision of the LEA in December 2011. The newly
enacted Article 3-1 of the LEA, for the first time in decades, tied the hands of the state
from wielding eminent domain power. More specifically, a “land use applicant” (more
on this in Part III) should “whenever possible, avoid choosing farmland and give
5
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priority consideration to public land or land owned by state-owned enterprises without
existing land use plan.” In response to the controversy of condemning premium
farmland to build science parks, Article 3-1 stipulates that for agricultural land, “the
competent authority in charge of the relevant industry should give consideration to the
public interest purpose and necessity of expropriation at the time of designation or
rezoning….If the agricultural land located within the land selected by a land use
applicant is exempted from the approval of the regional plan preparing authority with
regard to its rezoning, the approval of the agriculture authority under the municipal or
county (city) government shall first be obtained before the land is changed to nonagricultural use.” Premium agricultural land, according to the last paragraph of Article
3-1, in principle cannot be condemned, unless odd pieces of such land are interspersed
and it is difficult to circumvent condemning it. 5

Moreover, the also newly enacted Article 3-2 of the LEA requires a
comprehensive assessment of the public interest and necessity of the takings project.
The legislature even lays out the variables to be considered:

5

Article 3-1 of the LEA also details that the exceptions to this no-taking principle are takings for

“national defense, communication or transportation, or water conservancy undertaking; a public utility
enterprise for erecting power transmission lines; or for use in an infrastructure project already approved
by the Executive Yuan.”
6
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“1. Social factors: Including the size of population affected by the
expropriation, the age structure of the affected population, and the extent
of effects of the expropriation plan on the current status of the
surrounding communities, the life style of and health risk to
disadvantaged groups.

2. Economic factors: Including the effects of the expropriation plan
on tax revenue, food security, increase/decrease in jobs or population that
might be forced to change jobs, the costs of expropriation, public
facilities required of governments at all levels, the fiscal expenditure and
burden of governments, the agriculture, forestry, fishery, or animal
husbandry industry chain and the integrity of land use.

3. Cultural and ecological factors: Including changes in natural
urban/rural sceneries, cultural relics, living conditions or life style caused
by the expropriation plan, and its impacts on the ecological environment
of the area, surrounding residents or the society as a whole.
4. Sustainable development factors: Including national sustainable
development policies, sustainability indicators, and national land use
planning.
5. Others: Other relevant factors or factors that should be evaluated
7
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based on the individual expropriation plan.”

The Ministry of the Interior reviews the assessment of public interest and
necessity. Articles 2, 14, and 15 of the LEA prescribe that the Ministry of the Interior
establish a “Takings Review Task Force.” 6 Articles 13 and 13-1 authorize the
Ministry of the Interior, through the Takings Review Task Force, to review the
assessment of public interest and necessity, among others. The Ministry of the
Interior, in two administrative rules announced in 2011 and 2012 (the Ministry of the
Interior 2013a:1044), requires an additional review of public interest and necessity for
certain takings projects in an earlier stage of the whole process (see Part V and Figure
1). More specifically, these takings projects (1) are implemented as zone
expropriation (see also Article 4 of Regulations on Implementing Zone
Expropriation); (2) involve certain undertakings (for example, building or establishing
export zones, science parks, produce markets, airports); (3) expand urban planning; or
(4) develop more than 30 hectares. The two-time reviews have to be substantive and
de novo each time (Chen 2013: 283–84).

Administrative courts since 2012 also have to review the public interest and

6

The Task Force consists of 17 members. Eight members are officials from several relevant

government agencies. Nine members are scholars, experts, and representatives of private organizations.
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necessity of the takings project. In the several cases so far, courts appear to spill more
ink on necessity than on public interest. Nonetheless, in every case the court
concludes that the government has passed the tests. Thus, the more stringent
requirements by the legislature may not have nudged the administrative courts to
adopt a stricter review standard of the takings projects by the administrative branch.

III. SUBJECTS OF THE EMINENT DOMAIN POWER

Only the state can exercise the eminent domain power. The Ministry of the
Interior has the power to approve or disapprove a takings project as the designated
organ of the state (Article 14 of the LEA). The more important question under Taiwan
law is who can apply as a “land use applicant” to the Ministry of the Interior for
condemning real properties. In theory, private (legal) persons can be a land use
applicant (Wen 2013:528), but in practice, no statute has authorized any private
parties to become a land use applicant (the Ministry of the Interior 2013a:11).
According to Article 15 of the Enforcement Rules for the LEA, central government
agencies, city governments, county governments, town governments, and irrigation
associations 7 are land use applicants.

7

Irrigation associations are public legal persons in Taiwan law.
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Private takings, however, are not an empty set. As Bell (2009) points out, private
takings are often disguised. Article 787 of the Taiwan Civil Code, for instance,
recognizes “statutory easement” (Chang 2013a). Statutory easement, often called
legal servitude of passage in civil law jurisdictions such as Louisiana (Wilmore 1986;
Sentell 1994; Yiannopoulos 1996; Merwe 1999; Huffstetler 2002), deals with the
problem of accessing public roads for landlocked land. In general, a statutory
easement is granted to landlocked owners to pass through neighboring land. The
passage has to be necessary, and landlocked owners are required to compensate
owners of neighboring parcels. In the U.S., the takings nature of statutory easement is
clearer because administrative agencies are often involved in the process of
establishing a statutory easement (Merrill and Smith 2010: 204; Bruce and Ely 2011:
4:14). The U.S. Supreme Court, in Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 679–
80 (1979), has explicitly pointed out that easements of necessity (the doctrinal brother
of statutory easement) and eminent domain are alternative ways to reach the same
results for the state. Civil law, including Taiwan law, however, has rarely drawn
analogy of private condemnation to statutory easement. Hence, this chapter will not
foray further into statutory easement, but it is worth pointing out that statutes
regarding administrative law are not the exclusive sources for stipulations of takings
(in the functional sense).
10
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IV. JUST COMPENSATION

In Chang (2009, 2012, 2013b), I provide theoretical analysis and empirical
examinations of takings compensation law in Taiwan in 1954–1977 and 1977–2012.
One of the major changes in the 2012 revision of the LEA reformed the compensation
law. Before the reform, land value was assessed by combining a pre-determined and
under-assessed official land value with a pre-determined extra bonus. After the
reform, market value of land should be used to compensate condemnees. While land
value is a major component of the compensation package, it is not the only one.
Section A describes all the elements of takings compensation. Section B then focuses
on how market value of land has been appraised since 2012. Section C surveys the
judicial review of takings compensation cases.

A. The Elements of Takings Compensation

Total takings compensation includes that for land; constructional improvements
(such as a house); agricultural improvements (such as trees); incurred expenses for
land improvements; business losses; and relocation expenses. Takings compensation
“shall be paid within fifteen days after the expiration of the public announcement
11
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period” (Article 20 of the LEA), and the public announcement period is 30 days after
the city/county government, upon receiving the notice of approval from the Ministry
of the Interior, makes a public announcement and notifies condemnees (Article 18 of
the LEA). Except for land value compensation (which is discussed in Section B), I
introduce the appraisal methods for these compensations in turn. 8
Compensation for constructional improvements equals “replacement cost at the
time of expropriation” (Article 31 of the LEA). The Ministry of the Interior has
stipulated a few regulations that detail the proper assessment method. The city/county
governments (the first-level local governments in Taiwan) are responsible for
calculating the replacement costs themselves or commissioning real estate appraisers
to do the work (the Ministry of the Interior 2013a: 288). Only legal buildings are
eligible for compensation. 9
Compensation for agricultural improvements “shall be determined based on the
value of the ripened crops thereof, provided the crops are due to ripen in less than one
year from the date of expropriation, or based on the cost incurred in their planting and
cultivation with reference to their current value, provided the crops are due to ripen in
more than one year from the date of expropriation” (Article 31 of the LEA). The

8

I omit the discussion of compensation for contiguous land (not condemned but affected).

9

For a study on illegal buildings in Taiwan, see Chang and Smith (2015).
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Ministry of the Interior has enacted incredibly detailed tables for determining the
compensable value of various types of trees and flowers. As the tables are public
information and some plants are more valuable than others, condemnees have
incentives to rush to grow certain highly-compensable plants before the date of
expropriation. The Ministry of the Interior, in response, stipulates in its regulation that
only “normal planting” is compensable. 10 Many litigants in the administrative courts
dispute whether their planting process is normal. Satellite photos of the land in
question are often used to solve these cases (Chang 2012b).
According to the relevant laws and regulations, landowners who have incurred
expenses for improving land (such as constructing a conduit or a dam and paving a
road) and stopped the improvement work can receive reimbursement for the expenses
(Article 32 of the LEA).
Article 33 of the LEA stipulates that “[i]f the expropriated land or land
improvement was originally provided for legal business operations, the loss sustained
due to the cessation of business or shrinkage of business scale as a result of land or
land improvement expropriation shall be compensated.” Note that, again, only legal

10

This practice is authorized by Article 23 of the LEA: “….Nor shall the landowners or users …plant

more agricultural improvements on the land [since the public announcement of expropriation]. In case
any of the aforementioned works is ongoing when the public announcement is made, it shall be
immediately stopped.”
13
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businesses will be compensated. The Ministry of the Interior designed a formula to
compute positive business losses (the Ministry of the Interior 2013a: 291). Firms that
are losing money will of course not receive compensation.
Relocation expenses are a combination of different fees related to moving. In
short, the following items are compensable: Moving fees for graves, memorials, and
other constructions that owners prefer relocating; moving fees for residents whose
household registration records show that they are in residence six months before the
takings notice is posted; moving fees for large machinery, livestock, etc. There are
assessment standards for each category (the Ministry of the Interior 2013a: 292–93).

B. Appraisal of Land Value

Assessment of land value is the most complicated and controversial part of
determining the amount of takings compensation, as appraisal of land value now is
not formulaic and land value takes up a lion’s share of the total takings compensation.
Before 2012, determining the compensable land value was mechanical. Chang (2009;
2013b) has shown that a majority of condemnees were under-compensated under the
old regime, which relied on official land value for tax purposes in the critical
calculation. This section introduces and evaluates the new regime. My reform
proposal will appear in Part VIII.
14
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Condemnees shall receive “current market value” as compensation for
expropriation of their land (Article 30 of the LEA). The Land Value Evaluation
Committee in each city/county government determines the current market value. 11
The Committee is not itself an agency; rather, it makes decisions in the name of the
local city/county government. The compensation is paid from the budget of the land
use applicant. Below is a summary of how current market value is assessed and
adjusted.

The current market value is appraised by either local governments themselves or
real estate appraisers commissioned by local governments. Both have to follow the
Regulations on Appraising Current Market Value for Takings Compensation Purposes
in assessing the value of condemned land. 12 In short, the Regulation prescribes that
the comparable sale approach (also known as the market data approach) is the
principle, and the income capitalization approach is the exception.

More specifically, in principle, appraising current market value for takings
11

This committee has 17–19 members, and comprises the (deputy) mayor, a local legislator, five local

government officials, and several representatives from relevant associations.
12

Scholars have heavily criticized this stipulation, contending that (1) Regulations on Appraising

Current Market Value for Takings Compensation Purposes is not as sophisticated and accurate as
Regulations on Real Estate Appraisals; (2) real estate appraisers have to follow Regulations on Real
Estate Appraisals in their other works. Why is an idiosyncratic approach necessary for assessing
compensable land value? (Kang 2014: 21–22; Lin 2012: 84; Chen 2012: 102).
15

Yun-chien Chang

compensation purposes can be broken down into several steps (Articles 4–21 of the
Regulations on Appraising Current Market Value for Takings Compensation
Purposes):

1) collecting or revising all kinds of maps (such as urban planning and zoning maps);

2) collecting information on real estate sales between March 2 and September 1 of the
“baseline year” (Y1);

3) demarcating the jurisdictions into “land value zones” by land value, zoning,
infrastructure, among others;

4) estimating the “normal” 13 adjusted-to-September-1st unit price (Taiwan Dollars per
square meter) of the collected sales;

5) among the collected sales, choosing 3 comparable land parcels within the land
value zones where the takings project in question takes place;

6) comparing with the comparable land parcels and estimating the unit price of the
condemned land;

7) submitting the estimations to Land Value Evaluation Committee for approval or

13

The Regulations on Appraising Current Market Value for Takings Compensation Purposes specifies

rules for appraisers to adjust the abnormality of the sale prices.
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adjustment. The approved unit land will then be used for condemnations taking place
in the next, “current year” (Y2=Y1+1). 14

Market value of land fluctuates on a daily basis, so an up-to-date land value has
to be estimated for land expropriations that take place after July 1 of the current year.
An adjustment ratio should be computed based on the relative estimated price on
September 1 of the baseline year and March 1 of the current year. 15 Since August
2012, the actual sale prices of all real estate transactions have to be reported to the
government (Chang 2015). Thus, the government now has a firm grasp of the market
value of land. Since 2014 (the Ministry of the Interior 2013b: 14), the actual sale price
data were used to compute the adjustment ratio. More specifically, local governments
compare the average sale prices of comparable properties whose unit prices are
between the 25 percentile and the 75 percentile in both the baseline period (March 2
to September 1 of the baseline year) and the current period (September 2 of the
baseline year to March 1 of the current year) to estimate the percentage changes in
land value (the Ministry of the Interior 2013b: 14–16; Articles 26 and 29 of the
Regulations on Appraising Current Market Value for Takings Compensation

14

There are exceptions, but I omit the details here.

15

March 1 of the current year is six months after September 1 of the baseline year. September 1, as

described in the text, is the baseline date for adjusting sale prices of comparable land. Article 30 of the
LEA prescribes that local governments have to investigate market conditions every six months.
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Purposes). 16 Finally, the estimations of adjustment ratios should be sent to Land
Value Evaluation Committee for approval or adjustment.

In principle, condemnees receive the up-to-date current market value as
compensation. Takings projects finalized between January 1 and June 30 of the
current year should use the current market value estimated on the basis of market
value on September 1 of the baseline year. Those closed in the second half of the
current year should use the aforementioned market value adjusted by the adjustment
ratio, to update the current market value to March 1 of the current year. An exception:
if the current market value of the baseline year has been publicly announced and
notified to the condemnees, and the adjusted current market value of the current year
is lower than the former value, the higher market value of the baseline year shall still
be used to compensate the condemnees (Article 30 of the Enforcement Rules for the
LEA).

C. Judicial Review

Administrative courts defer to the local governments’ assessment of current
16

That is, the 25% highest and 25% lowest unit prices are excluded. The average prices of the rest of

the unit prices in both periods are calculated separately and then compared.
Adjustment ratio=average price in the current period / average price in the baseline period.
18
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market value. In the pre-2012 regime, takings compensation was determined by the
pre-announced official land value. Administrative courts’ hesitation in giving the
official values a hard look is understandable, but not justified. In the post-2012
regime, however, the legislature prescribes compensation of current market value. As
current market value is an objective, verifiable fact that anyone with the right training
can estimate, administrative courts should substantively review the estimates of
current market value by the governments, rather than deferring to them. So far (until
October 10, 2014), I have found 6 administrative court cases which apply the new
Article 30 of the LEA. In all six cases, however, the courts defer to the local
governments. In Chang (2013c), I found that administrative courts in Taiwan before
2012 only conducted a “procedural review” of takings compensation determination,
rather than a “substantive review.” That is, administrative courts only examined
whether all the procedures stipulated in the regulations and statutes were followed. If
they were, administrative courts assumed that the estimates were correct, or at least
worthy of their deference. It appears that this mindset has not changed.

V. OVERALL DUE PROCESS

The due process for takings and its preceding procedures stipulated by the LEA
is shown in a flow chart, Figure 1. Stages 1–5 are the preceding procedures, and
19
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stages 6–15 are the takings procedures. Due to limited space, I will only focus on the
negotiated purchase procedure (stage 5), a mandatory process before a land use
applicant can apply for expropriation.
In principle, land use applicants have to negotiate in good faith and in their best
efforts with the owners of the land needed for the undertakings, before applying to the
Ministry of the Interior for expropriation (Article 11 of the LEA). Land use applicants
should bargain with the owners based on “market value” (Article 11 of the LEA). In
both the negotiated purchase here and the takings setting, the legislature uses market
value as the standard for compensation. Nonetheless, Article 30 of the LEA stipulates
that the market value in the takings procedure has to be approved by the Land Value
Evaluation Committee, while Article 11 of the LEA defines market value as “mean
normal transaction price in the market” without designating any agency or committee
to approve the estimated market value. The Ministry of the Interior has advised land
use applicants that the market value used in the negotiated purchase procedure need
not equate the market value approved by the Land Value Evaluation Committee; in
fact, a hard, non-negotiable bottom-line is the antithesis of the spirit of negotiated
purchase (the Ministry of the Interior 2013a: 50–51, 1071–73).
The current practice of negotiated purchase is still in flux. Taoyuan County still
relied on the pre-2012 regime, using Publicly Announced Land Value (an official land
20
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value for property tax purposes) plus a 40 percent bonus, claiming that this would
give condemnees more than the government-assessed market value—which, I should
note, probably is below the real market value. By contrast, the New Taipei City
commissioned independent real estate appraisers to assess the market value to be
offered to condemnees. I cannot find any data on how often land use applicants
“successfully” persuade the landowners to sell the land in question to them. My
conjecture is that if the offered price in the negotiation is not much different from the
current market value to be used in the takings stage (as it is often alleged to be the
case), landowners would not have incentives to sell their properties to the land use
applicants, as they receive tax benefits and condemnee status in takings procedures,
among other reasons. Finally, I have found a Supreme Administrative Court case
rendered in 201 that took a hard look at the negotiated purchase procedure, revoking
and remanding the case to the lower court to review again whether the land use
applicant had made a good-faith negotiated purchase.

VI. DISTRIBUTION OF DEVELOPMENT SURPLUSES

In Taiwan, landowners are excluded from appropriating any part of the
development surplus. Sharing surpluses implies that condemnees will receive more
than the market value of their properties as compensation. For Taiwanese condemnees
21
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in the past few decades who did not receive even market-value compensation, getting
a dip of the surplus is unrealistic. The Constitutional Court of Taiwan, in
Interpretation No. 579, has ruled that the takings compensation must be
commensurate with the losses of the condemnees. 17 Losses refer to the property value
taken away from the condemnees, not the lost opportunities to gain from the takings
project. Hence, for ordinary takings, all development surpluses go to the state.
The compensation mechanism for zone expropriation, however, might enable
condemnees to share some of the development surpluses. In zone expropriation
procedures, condemnees have the option to choose between compensation in cash (as
in land expropriation procedure) and compensation in kind—namely, condemnees can
request to receive post-development land in lieu of cash compensation (Articles 39–
40 of the LEA). The size of the post-development land parcel shall, in principle, be no
larger than 50%, but be larger than 40% of the area of the condemned land parcel,
unless “otherwise approved by the superior competent authority under special
circumstances” (Article 39). In general, the floor-area ratios of the post-development
land increase, market unit value often more than doubles, and condemnees who
choose the in-kind option also receive tax benefits (Chen 2013: 272). As a result, the

17

English translation of this Interpretation is available at the official website of the Constitutional

Court http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=579.
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market value of the smaller post-development plot received by the condemnees as inkind compensation is higher than the cash compensation the condemnees would have
received. As the cash compensation is assessed based on pre-development land value,
condemnees in zone expropriation who opts for in-kind compensation receive some of
the development surplus. The government, however, still keeps most of the
development surplus.

VII. THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM

The dispute resolution system regarding takings contains several levels of
scrutiny. Any person with an interest in the expropriated land or land improvement
(often, but not limited to, condemnees of land ownership) can object to the contents of
the public announcements of takings within the announcement period. The amount of
compensation is included in the announcement, but other matters (such as the scope of
the expropriation) are contained, too. The local governments shall investigate the
matter and notify the interested person in writing of the findings and actions taken. If
those interested are still discontent, and they have contested the amount of the
compensation, the local government has the discretion to refer the matter to the Land
Value Evaluation Committee for re-consideration. If those interested still disagree
with the result of reconsideration, they can initiate “administrative appeal.” Provided
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that the interested people challenged matters other than compensation, the reconsideration stage would be skipped.
“Review committees” in the administrative appeal are expected to conduct
“merits review”; that is, modifying improper yet legal administrative decisions. In
other words, they should consider every aspect of an administrative act, examine
whether it fits the government policies, and explore whether a different decision
would better realize the legislative intent. When an agency uses its discretion and
makes a bad judgment (but not to the extent of abuse of discretion), or an agency
interprets a statute in an allowable (but not ideal) way, the administrative court cannot
vacate it. Instead, the law requires the review committees to redress the harms by
revoking the original administrative act and directing the administrative agencies to
come up with a better decision. Therefore, although administrative agencies have
discretion in interpreting statutes, review committees’ discretion trumps the agencies’,
and the law does not expect review committees to defer to administrative agencies’
discretion in fact-finding or statutory interpretation. Review committees, however, do
not appear to be very active. The revocation rate in all the administrative appeal
procedures in the central government level was 10% between 2005 and 2009 (Chang
2014). In a prior empirical study, I found that takings compensation cases took up
about 14% of all administrative appeal cases handled by Review Committee of the
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Ministry of the Interior in 2006–2009, and the revocation rate of these takings
compensation cases was 10.3%; more importantly, review committees rarely
conducted merits reviews, limiting themselves to merely legality reviews (Chang
2012b). My comprehensive survey of all administrative reviews rendered in the first
nine months of 2014 revealed that, in applying the new law, the Review Committee of
the Ministry of the Interior has taken a more active role in certain cases, revoking the
assessment of takings compensation by the administrative agency; nevertheless,
deference to such decisions still appears to be the norm.
The last stop in the dispute resolution mechanism is the administrative court—
unless the condemnees lose and bring their cases to the Constitutional Court, and the
cases are taken. As the condemned land or fixtures are most likely worth more than
13,000 US dollars, the court of the first instance is the High Administrative Court
(Articles 104-1 & 229 of the Administrative Litigation Act). In principle, the
condemnees can appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court if the high court
decisions are in contravention of the law (Articles 238, 242–243 of the Administrative
Litigation Act). The administrative courts in Taiwan generally are not big believers in
judicial activism. Chen (2013: 165), however, has identified several administrative
court cases that chastised the administrative agencies that treat negotiated purchases
as a mere formality, instead of bargaining in good faith. That said, as noted above,
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administrative courts are highly deferential to the administrative agencies in terms of
assessment of takings compensation.

VIII. EVALUATING THE TAKINGS REGIME IN TAIWAN

The 2012 reform of the LEA marks the third major change of takings
compensation since 1949 (Chang 2013b). Generally speaking, this latest reform may
be optimal in terms of law in books. Of course, it is the law in action that matters for
the condemnees and the general public. As the new LEA is still young, it is unclear
whether the amended regime can guarantee condemnees with the basic respect they
deserve in a democracy. This chapter has offered evidence for worries, as the
administrative agencies have not shown significant changes in their course of business
and the administrative courts appear to be deferential as usual. Given an inactive
court, one should not rely too heavily on the administrative court to raise the standard
of review of the public interest in takings cases. If land value appraisals are still
considered highly technical matters that only the governments or the real estate
appraisers they hire can understand, administrative courts will still pass on reviewing
these critical decisions. This part advances a new approach, under which estimation of
market value of condemned land through hedonic regression models with block-level
sale data is mandatory. By making the estimation more transparent, I hope that courts
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will become more willing to review the decision. Provided that condemnees can really
receive market value as compensation, it leaves much less room for governments to
condemn unnecessary land. This is the law of demand.
Real estate appraisers in Taiwan, like their colleagues elsewhere, still largely rely
on the conventional method to estimate market value. Appraisals are handiwork,
based on experience, and their subjectivity makes them unlikely to be contested.
The era of big data has come to Taiwan, and hedonic regression models that
utilize big data to assess market value of land have become too powerful to ignore.
Actual market sale prices of real estates had been kept secret for decades. None other
than the transacting parties themselves (and perhaps their agents) knew the actual
prices. Transaction taxes were levied based on official land value, not actual sale
prices. As a result, no one had large enough data to utilize regression models.
Things changed, however, in 2012. As part of his presidential re-election
campaign, President MA Ying-jeou advocated “residential justice.” The legislature
passed or revised five statutes, three of which mandate that the actual sale prices of
immovable properties be reported to the government. The “actual price report” regime
came into effect on August 1, 2012. The raw data are available for download, and the
competent agency, the Ministry of the Interior, started a website that enables users to
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check sale prices in any region in Taiwan through a graphic interface. 18 Users can
also acquire information on that website regarding the transacting month, total area,
zoning, layout of the apartment (such as how many rooms), etc. (Chang 2015).
New and larger data sets are churned out every day. From August 2012 to
February 2013 alone, there were 188,900 reported sales of land and/or building. The
data regarding the sales of land are summarized in Table 3. From August 2012 to
November 2014, the reported number of sales of land and/or building increased to
840,165.

With these (ever-increasing) sets of data and a properly specified hedonic
regression model, market value of any land parcel in Taiwan since August 2012 can be
estimated with pretty high accuracy. My co-authors and I have developed a hedonic
regression model elsewhere (Chang, Chen, and Lin 2014). The model, introduced in
details below, is an ordinary least square (OLS) model with robust standard errors. The
dependent variable is the actual sale price. The independent variables control for the
land size, zoning, transaction month, and the number of plots involved. The models
take the following form:

Pi = α + βAi + θN i + δZ i + ηM i + γSi + vi

18

http://lvr.land.moi.gov.tw/N11/homePage.action#.
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where P is natural log of sale prices; A is natural log of land area; N is natural log of
the number of land plots involved; Z are 9 zoning dummies that capture 10 types of
zonings: non-urban (agricultural—not prime), non-urban (agricultural—prime), nonurban (industrial), non-urban (preserved), non-urban (residential), urban (industrial),
urban (residential), urban (business), urban (agricultural), and urban (other); M are
dummy variables indicating the month of the transaction. S are a series of dummies
indicating the strata of the town/city in which the land in question is located. Strata 1
to 7 represent central business districts, industrial and business districts, growing
towns, towns with traditional industries, lowly developed towns, aging towns, and
least developed towns, respectively. 19 v is the error term. The coefficients to be
estimated are α, β, δ, θ, η, γ. The regression result is shown in Table 4. A high Rsquare of 0.73 means that this simple model can capture 73% of the deviations of the
actual market prices from the average market prices. I am positive that most social
scientists who do quantitative work will agree that an R-square of 0.73 is very
satisfactory. With more data and more information to improve the model, using
hedonic regression models to estimate market value will become more and more
accurate in Taiwan.

19

The stratum classification is based on Hou et al. (2008).
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I am not proposing the banishment of real estate appraisers from the takings
procedure. Not at all. There is a confidence interval in any statistical estimates, and
hedonic regression models are vulnerable to idiosyncrasy of land characteristics.
Instead of entirely relying on statistical methods or subjective appraisals, why not get
the best of both worlds? The governments can (and, I think, should) use the estimates
(with, say, a 95% or 90% confidence interval) by the hedonic regression model as the
benchmark, and require real estate appraisers to adjust the benchmark, if necessary.
The appraisal reports should detail the reasons for the adjustments. Both the
regression estimates and the appraisal reports should be provided to the landowners
no later than the negotiated purchase stage. The informed landowners can then decide
to accept the offer or challenge the amount of takings compensation later. Market
value appraisal is objective, and local governments and real estate appraisers should
thus be held more accountable than before by administrative courts. In other words,
administrative courts should no longer defer on appraisal matters. Rather, experts
hired by the condemnees should be allowed to debate the merits of the land value
assessed by local governments. Administrative courts should commission independent
appraisers to evaluate the quality of the appraisal reports by both sides. In the long
run, only a more active court can

bring equity to the condemnees.
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IX. CONCLUSION

A pessimistic story emerges from my survey of the six pillars of eminent domain
law in Taiwan. In four pillars—public interest criteria, just compensation, due process,
and the dispute resolution system—the 2012 legislative reform improved the takings
law in the book. Nevertheless, the new law did not appear to bring along new
practices, at least not yet. The administrative agencies and the administrative courts,
as current evidence suggests, followed the letter but not the spirit of the new
legislature mandate. The subjects of the eminent domain power remain unchanged, as
also their attitude toward wielding the eminent domain power. The new law promises
market value compensation for landowners, who still have no share of the
development surpluses.

The lesson for other jurisdictions is that a quantitative method should be used in
the eminent domain procedure. In my prior work and this chapter, I have
demonstrated the power of hedonic regression models in accurately estimating land
value. Also, I have shown that various assessment methods, based on owners’ selfassessment or on real estate appraisers’ assessments for condemnors, have failed to
reach the goal of giving condemnees market value compensation. It is not that human
being’s evaluation is always inaccurate (though it is sometimes). Rather, the problem
has often been that the evaluation is biased by various other concerns, such as paying
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less taxes or gaining more business. Statistical methods have a cold appearance.
Human right advocates hardly characterize statistics as protectors of property or other
human rights. The counter-intuitive lesson from the takings law is that cold method
can yield warm results.
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Table 1 Land Expropriation in Taiwan, 2001–2013
Year

Water Public Health and Education
Grand National Transport Public
Conservat Environmental
and
ation
Utilities
Total Defense
ion
Protection
Culture

Public
Building

State-own
enterprise

Social
Welfare

Others

2001 1340.9
2002 1075.2
2003 967.0
2004 970.7
2005 1085.6
2006 704.8

15.0
41.2
64.6
62.2
17.5
100.5

843.4
455.7
554.1
379.4
503.0
193.7

4.2
43.7
7.9
4.0
20.5
18.2

267.7
292.6
185.6
194.2
178.5
133.6

14.4
1.9
41.0
11.0
9.5
0.3

13.8
9.7
3.5
5.8
10.2
2.3

1.3
12.8
43.2
0.4
8.8
0.5

22.7
10.5
11.8
20.3
2.7
4.6

0.2
0.6
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0

158.2
206.5
55.1
293.3
334.7
251.0

2007 672.1
2008 572.9
2009 1658.4
2010 1169.7
2011 669.4
2012 320.2
2013 565.6

6.1
3.9
0.6

286.8
188.6
438.6

0.7
27.6
16.9

211.4
221.4
259.8

9.0
17.2
3.6

1.0
4.7
1.0

0.8
2.7
0.5

3.5
7.7
4.6

—
0.2
0.1

152.8
98.8
932.6

30.6
0.0
12.6
13.2

219.6
135.0
73.0
112.2

3.5
0.1
0.2
48.1

840.6
488.9
232.3
111.5

6.6
0.0
0.0
3.2

1.1
0.4
0.0
7.6

0.8
1.5
0.9
0.0

2.5
1.6
0.1
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

64.5
41.9
1.2
269.7

Total 11772.4

368.2

4383.2

195.6

3618.1

117.9

61.2

74.3

92.7

1.2

2860.0

Unit: Hectare. Source: the Ministry of the Interior, available at http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/stat/year/y05-08.xls.
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Table 2 Zone Expropriation in Taiwan, 2001–2013

Year

Number of
Zone

Expropriated Area
Total

Public

Private

Usage of Land
Construction
Public
Special
Land
Facility Land Agricultural Zone

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

40
42
50
59
64
75
77
79
84

2686.4
2895.8
3414.1
4584.7
5320.0
6652.8
6711.4
7020.5
7137.2

713.4
722.1
813.4
873.1
911.6
1159.2
1163.0
1284.3
1307.1

1973.0
2173.7
2600.7
3711.6
4408.4
5493.5
5548.4
5736.3
5830.1

1413.5
1521.6
1852.2
2621.7
2982.0
3644.1
3678.9
3782.4
3839.2

1272.8
1374.2
1561.8
1962.9
2337.9
3008.7
3032.5
3238.2
3298.1

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

2010
2011
2012
2013

91
93
95
100

7448.8
7650.2
7672.2
8002.2

1344.7
1375.0
1377.5
1409.3

6104.0
6275.1
6294.7
6592.9

4004.0
4111.6
4122.3
4310.8

3444.8
3538.5
3549.9
3691.3

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1

Total

949

77196.1

14453.7

62742.4

41884.3

35311.7

0.1

Unit: Hectare. Source: the Ministry of the Interior, available at http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/stat/year/y05-15.xls.
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Table 3 Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Hedonic Regression Models
Panel A: Continuous variables
Variables

N

Mean

Median

60,530
110,258,700
Sale Price
60,530
1,471
Land Area
60,530
1.9
Number of plot
Panel B: categorical variables (N=60,530.)

St. Dev.

Min.

Max.

2,900,000

524,863,400

54

5,682,620,000

358

4,598

0.01

411,300

1

2.8

1

88

%

Variable types and names
Zoning
non-urban (agricultural—not prime)
non-urban (preserved)
non-urban (industrial)
non-urban (agricultural—prime)

9.6
12.5
0.8
19.5
4.4

non-urban (residential)
urban (industrial)
urban (residential)
urban (business)
urban (agricultural)

1.7
21.0
2.2
9.5
9.6

Strata
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

100
7.3
15.3
32.1
17.8
19.5
6.5
1.6

Months
Before 2012/8
2012/8
2012/9
2012/10
2012/11
2012/12
2013/1
2013/2

100
8.6
15.5
15.1
14.4
15.0
17.9
11.5
2.0

Source: Chang, Chen, and Lin (2014).
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Table 4 Regression results for estimating market price and market rent
Dependent variable: ln of total sale price
=1 if stratum 1
2.746***
(0.025)
=1 if stratum 2
2.024***
(0.021)
=1 if stratum 3
1.549***
(0.018)
=1 if stratum 4
1.394***
(0.018)
=1 if stratum 5
0.424***
(0.018)
Ln of land area
0.857***
(0.003)
Ln of number of plot
0.053***
(0.007)
Zoning dummies
Month dummies

Yes
Yes

Constant

7.779***
(0.088)

Observations
R-squared

60,530
0.730

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Source: Chang, Chen, and Lin (2014).
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Figure 1 Flow Chart of the Eminent Domain Procedure
1
Select land
2

Informal hearing (at least twice)

Formal hearing
Approval by relevant agencies

3
Undertaking projects
Public interest and necessity report
4
Land survey
Rezoning or changing

Title
5

Succeed

transfer

Negotiated purchase
Fail

urban planning
Notify

6
Fixture survey
7

Apply for takings

Require more or better documents

Require
8

more or
better

Takings

Reject

documents
9
Approval of expropriation
10
Public notice and inform condemnees
11

12

Pay compensation
None claims

Owner
claims

Deposit the money in escrow accounts

13
Title transfer registration

Filing

14
Clearing fixtures
15
Use land as planned
Source: The Ministry of the Interior (2013a: 24). Note: dotted arrows and boxes are procedures not
always required.
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